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The fact that some industries  will pay higher  (or lower) wages  to the 
same grade of labor has been  amply demonstrated  in the literature,  from Dunlop 
(19571,  who  first pointed  out the existence  of wage contours,  Slichter  (1950), 
and Weiss  (1966) to the more  recent  studies  reviewed  in Dickens  and Katz 
(1987).  In this latter  group, average  industry wages  (combining both  male  and 
female workers)  are usually  regressed  on various  industry characteristics, 
including  the mean  education  and age of workers.  These studies  also use  the 
percent  of females  employed  in the industry  as an independent  variable 
(typically yielding  a negative  regression  coefficient).  Krueger  and Summers 
(1988) used  industry  wage premia,  average  industry wage  levels  adjusted  for 
industry  characteristics,  as the dependent  variable,  though  they also combined 
the wages  of male  and female workers. 
One exception  is the paper  of Hodson  and England  (1986) who  ran separate 
regressions  on male  and female earnings,  but  they used averages  wages  for each 
gender  in each  industry  as the dependent  variable  rather  than individual 
wages.  A second  is Blau and Kahn  (1992) who  examined male  and female  industry 
wage premia  in different  countries  (including  the U.S.),  though  they used  only 
nine  industry  categories  and only a small number  of controls  for occupation. 
However,  where  appropriate,  we will  compare  our findings with  theirs below. 
Our 1995 study examined  the pattern  of interindustry  wage  differentials 
separately  for women  and men  in the United  States  on the basis  of data on 
individual  wages  and related  characteristics  contained  in the 1988 Current -2- 
Population  Survey  (CPS).  We were particularly  interested  in whether  patterns 
of wage premia by  industry were similar for female and male workers.  We found 
that like male workers,  female workers  showed a wide variation  in industry 
wage differentials,  after adjusting  for productivity-related  characteristics 
such as education  and age, across industries.  Among  full-time,  year-round 
workers  in three digit  industries  the female premia  ranged  from -0.52 (lodging 
except hotels)  to +0.55  (tire manufacturers).  For males,  they ranged  from a 
low of  -0.69 (religious organizations)  to +0.36  (paper mills).' 
Our 1995 study also found that the pattern  of industry wage 
differentials  was similar  -- though not identical  -- between  female and male 
workers  (the rank correlation  coefficient between  the two sets of wage premia 
ranged  from 0.79 to 0.95, depending  on the level of disaggregation  used).  We 
found that the gender  gap in wage premia  at the industry level explained 
between  12 and 22 percent  of the overall gender gap in earnings.  Differences 
in the distributions  of male and female employment  across  these industries 
accounted  for only another  13 to 19 percent of the overall gender wage  gap in 
our study. 
Another  interesting  finding emerged from our 1991 study.  We found there 
a strong positive  relation between  the rate of decline  in gender  employment 
segregation  on the occupational  level and the rate of employment  growth  of the 
occupation.  Over the period  1970-80, for example,  the Duncan  and Duncan  Index 
(averaged across  235 industries)  declined by 0.19 in the fastest-growing 
occupational  group and by only 0.05 in the slowest growing one.  The fastest 
growing  occupations  were also the ones where relative  female earnings  rose the 
most.  From this set of results, we concluded  that growth might be associated 
with  lowering barriers  or otherwise  increasing opportunities  for females  to -3- 
enter  industries where male workers  (and their associated high wages) 
predominate.  This conclusion  is supported by the work of Bell and Freeman 
(1991) who  found that over the period  from 1970 to 1987 the largest  increases 
in the share of female workers  in industry employment  occurred  in the highest 
wage  industries. 
The present  study examines  factors that might explain  the difference 
between  female  and male  industry wage premia.  It focuses on three industry 
characteristics  in particular  -- the extent to which  firms in each industry 
were  likely  to be targeted  for Affirmation  Action  compliance  review or 
investigation,  industry employment  growth, and industry profitability.  We 
find strong  evidence  that all three factors help narrow  the gender  gap in 
industry wage premia.  Other characteristics  that we have  looked at, including 
average plant  size, the capital  intensity of the production  process,  both  the 
average  level and variance  in worker  education,  and changes  in overall  sales 
and wage  levels were  statistically  much less important. 
The next  section of the paper  (Section 2) provides  a discussion  of why 
wage premia  might  differ between male and female workers within  the same 
industry.  Section  3 introduces our model and estimation  techniques,  and 
Section 4 discusses  the regression  results. Concluding  remarks  are made  in the 
final part of the paper. 
2.  Uhv !Should  Industries  Pay Different Wane Remi_a to Males  and Females? 
Before  discussing  why wage premia might differ between  genders,  it is 
first helpful  to address  the issue of why  industries pay wage premia  at all. 
There are, generally  speaking,  two different  schools of thought on this issue: 
(1) efficiency  wage  theories, where  industries with positive  wage premia  find -4- 
it profit-maximizing  to pay workers  above market wages  in order to reduce 
shirking  on jobs where  it is very difficult or expensive  to monitor  workers  or 
in order  to minimize  turnover and the costs associated with  it; and  (2) rent 
sharing  or equity wage  theories  in which high profit  firms in protected 
markets  share some part of the profits with workers  either because  of strong 
union pressure  or the threat of unionization  or simply because  they have  the 
ability  to pay higher  wages. 
A third line of argument  is that industry wage premia  actually  represent 
unmeasured  differences  in worker  quality.  However,  as Krueger  and Summers 
(1987) note,  the pattern  of research  shows a remarkable  similarity  of the rank 
order of industries  in terms of wage premia  across countries  and also over 
time within  the same country  (also see Gittleman  and Wolff,  1993, for similar 
evidence).  So, if workers  in high premia  industries are more productive, 
there then must be some consistent,  industry-specific  characteristics  which 
make  them more productive.  They see this as essentially  rent sharing which 
may coincidentally  elicit greater effort from workers.  They further point  out 
that when  individual workers  change  industries,  their wage change  is strongly 
correlated  with  the difference  in average wage differentials  between  the 
industry  they left and the one they entered  (while it is unlikely  that their 
ability has changed). 
In this study, we also consider which of the competing  theories  can best 
be used  to explain  gender differences  in industry wage premia.  One 
possibility  is that males  and females occupy different  occupational  ranks 
within  an industry.  If females, for example, are usually placed  in jobs where 
efficiency  wages  are not needed  (where shirking  is less likely or turnover 
less costly),  this might mean  that males would  get larger wage premia. -5- 
However,  the industry wage premia we use here are derived  from earnings 
function  regressions  in which  the occupation  of the worker  (13 one-digit 
occupational  dummy variables)  is taken into account,  so that the coefficients 
on our industry dummy variables  (used as the basis  for a measure  of the gender 
gap in industry wage premium  in the present  study) are computed  after the 
occupation  effects  are partially  controlled  for. 
This method  of controlling  for occupational  differences  does not, 
unfortunately,  take into account the possibility  that the same occupation  may 
be harder  to monitor  in one industry than in another.  Sicherman  (1996), for 
example,  finds a very high  level of occupational  gender segregation  within  the 
firm that he  studied.  His results show that women had higher  quit rates than 
men  in the firm, and attributed  this to the fact that women  occupied  lower- 
level jobs.  If efficiency  wages are paid to workers  from whom  long tenure  is 
expected  to be more  likely, a disparity  in gender wage premia within  the same 
firm might  result. 
The existence  of different male and female occupational  distributions 
within  the same industry could also be compatible with rent sharing  theories, 
if it were more  likely that equity wages are shared with  the most powerful 
workers  in the industry, presumably  the male workers.  However,  it seems more 
likely  that oligopolistic,  high-profit  industries concerned with  equity  (or 
possessing  a greater able to pay) would give both male and female employees 
above average wages.  In this case, the gender gap in wage premia  should be 
narrower  in such industries. 
Another  possible  explanation  is that males and females have  different 
geographic  distributions  within  the same industry.  Although  our earnings 
function  regressions  did control for place of residence  (central city versus -6- 
other;  size of population  of SMSA of residence;  and four regions  of the 
country),  they did not control  for differences  in male and female  labor supply 
by locality.  If industries have differing  elasticities  of substitution  of 
female  for male  labor  (or differing  discriminatory  preferences  by gender), 
geographic  variations  in the relative supplies of male and female  labor might 
cause differences  in gender wage premia.  For example,  in a locality with  a 
limited  supply  of male  labor,  industries with a high elasticity  of 
substitution  of female for male labor would hire more females  (with lower wage 
premia  since female labor supply  is more elastic)  and industries with  a low 
elasticity  of substitution  (or greater preferences  for men) would have  to pay 
higher  wage premia  to attract male workers.  Some supporting  evidence  is 
provided  by Leonard  (1996), who finds that changes  in gender wage  gaps varied 
widely  across  cities  in the U.S. 
This argument would  account for why men earn higher  premia  than women. 
As shown  in Appendix  2, the great majority,  128 out of 158 industries,  are 
ones in which men received  greater wage premia  than women  in 1988.  However, 
there are 30 industries  in which women had greater wage premia.  The converse 
of this argument  is hard  to make since it implies that cities with a limited 
supply  of female  labor also are ones in which  the female labor supply  is less 
elastic  than the local male  supply. 
Another  explanation  of gender differences  in industry wage premia  might 
come from McGoldrick  (1995).  She finds that both male and female workers 
receive  compensating  wage differentials  for working  in an occupation  with 
unsystematic  earnings uncertainty  (that is, variations  in earnings which  are 
not associated  with  factors over which  the individual worker  has control). 
Moreover,  the compensating  differentials  are greater for women  than men  for -/- 
the same degree  of earnings uncertainty.  The same argument might be applied 
to industry  of employment.  However,  the results reported  in Appendix  2 
suggest just  the opposite  -- namely  that male workers  receive  larger positive 
compensation  for unsystematic  earnings uncertainty  and females are less risk 
averse  (that is, more willing  to tolerate working  in an industry with  lower 
average but more positively  skewed wages). 
Finally,  a divergence  in wage premia between male and female workers 
might  simply be due to discrimination  against female workers.  Leonard  (1984a) 
found more  discrimination  by gender than by race when he compared workers' 
wages with  their marginal  products.  He suggested  that female workers  may 
enter high wage  industries  in greater numbers at the cost of receiving  pay 
below  their marginal  product.  Whether wage premia reflect  rent sharing  or 
efficiency  wages,  earnings  opportunities  are generally  lower for females  than 
for males.  High wage  industries can thus afford to give female workers  a 
smaller  share of rents or a smaller efficiency wage premium  to discourage 
shirking. 
3.  Our Model  and Estimation  Technicmes 
The variable  of chief interest in this study is GGIWP,  the gender  gap in 
industry wage premia.  GGIWP  is the difference between male and female pay  in 
an industry  after netting  out all of the wage differences  that are related  to 
the productivity-related  characteristics  of the worker. 
We  first estimate  earnings  functions  for male and female workers 
separately  using  individual  data 
March  supplement).  The earnings 
(1)  In Wi = a + b,EDUCi + b,EXP, 
from the 1988 Current Population  Survey  (the 
function  is given by:' 
+ b,EXP',  + b&URBAN, + b,SMSAi + ZcjREGIONji + -a- 
where 
b,MARRIED, + b&ACE,  + CajOCCUPji  + X/ljINDUSji  + ui 
Wi = hourly  wage of individual  i, estimated  as the ratio of annual 
earnings  in 1987 to the product of weeks worked  in 1987 and hours 
worked  per interview week. 
EDUCi = years of schooling  of individual  i. 
EXPi = years  of work experience  of individual  i, estimated  as age less 
schooling  less 6. 
URBANi = dummy variable  for urban residence  (central city versus  other). 
SMSA, = size of population  of SMSA of residence. 
REGION, = set of 3 dummy variables  for region of country  (Northeast, 
South, and West). 
MARRIED, = dummy variable  for marital  status  (currently married,  with 
spouse present versus  other). 
RACE, = dummy variable  for race  (non-white versus white). 
OCCUPji = set of 13 dummy variables  for one-digit  occupation  j 
ui  = stochastic  error term. 
GGIWP  is given by: 
(2)  GGIWP  =  ijfi  -  i$  = (if  + cfi)  -  (2  + $) 
the difference  between  the female  (f) and male  (m) estimated  coefficient  bi on 
the dummy variable  for industry i after netting out the adjusted wage 
difference  between  the average workers  of each gender  in the omitted  industry, 
public  administration  (the intercepts  from the regressions  for each gender,  2' 
and 2).  Most  of the industry gender wage gaps will be negative,  since men 
generally  earn more  than women,  even after controlling  for the productivity- -9- 
related  individual  characteristics  of workers.  Values  of GGIWP  for three 
digit  industries  are taken directly  from our 1995 study and are shown  in 
Appendix  2.3 
The dependent variable  in the regression model  in this paper  is GGIWP. 
Our model  relates  the gender gap in industry wage premia  for each industry  i 
to various  characteristics  of that industry.  The estimating  equation  is: 
(1)  GGIWPi = a +b,  AA, + b, EMPGRTH, + b, PROPRATE, + b, PLANTSIZ, + 
b, PAYCHNG, + b, SALESCHG, + b, MEANEDUCi + b, STDEDUC + 
b,  KLRATIO, + ei 
where: 
AA,  =  the relative  incidence of federal contractor  firms in industry  i, 
which  is intended as an indicator of the likelihood  that a firm in 
this industry might be the target of an Affirmative  Action 
compliance  review or that firms in this industry might  expect  to 
become  targets for such a review. 
EMPGRTHi = the percentage  growth  in employment  in industry  i over the 
1986-88 period. 
PROF'RATE,  = average profit  rate for firms in industry  i over the 3 year 
period,  1986-88, defined as total business  receipts minus  cost of 
sales and operations  per dollar of assets. 
PLANTSIZ,  = average number  of workers per establishment  in industry  i 
over the 3 year period,  1986-88. 
PAYCHNGi = percent  change  in the annual payroll  of industry  i over the 3 
year period,  1986-88. 
SALESCHG,  = percent  change  in the total business  receipts  of industry  i 
over the 3 year period,  1986-88. -lO- 
MEANEDUC, = average years of schooling  for workers  in industry  i in 
1988. 
STDEDUC, = the standard deviation  in years of schooling  among workers  in 
industry  i in 1988. 
KLRATIOi = average value of assets per employee  for firms in industry  i 
in 1988. 
Ei  = stochastic  error term, which  is assumed to be  independently  (but 
not necessarily  identically)  distributed. 
See Appendix  1 for sources and methods  for each of the variables. 
Two samples are used to estimate  the model.  The first, called  the 
EVERYIND  sample,  includes all of the 156 industries for which  data are 
available  for all of the independent variables.4  For the EVERYIND  sample,  the 
dependent  variable  is the gender gap in industry wage premia based  on male and 
female  industry wage differentials  taken from earnings  functions  estimated 
over samples of all workers,  including both part- and full-time workers,  as 
well as part- and full-year ones.  The second, called  the SIGFTYS  sample, 
includes only those industries  for which male and female  industry dummy 
variables  for full-time,  full-year  (FTFY) workers  are both  statistically 
significant  at the 10 percent  level  (a total of 81 industries).  The dependent 
variable  for this sample  is the gender gap in industry wage premia based  on 
wage differentials  taken from earnings functions estimated  for FTFY workers 
only.  Descriptive  statistics  on GGIWP for alternative  samples are shown  in 
Table  1. 
Two estimation  techniques  are used.  The first is ordinary  least squares 
(OLS), under  the assumption  that the error term is identically  distributed. 
The second  is weighted  least squares  (WLS), with the industry's  share of total employment  as the weight,  in order to correct for potential 
heteroschedasticity. 
4.  Renression  Results 
The regression  results,  shown in Table 2, provide  strong  support  to our 
principal  hypotheses.  The goodness of fit was greater for the SIGFTYS  sample 
than the EVERYIND  sample, as might be expected,  since the former  is restricted 
to industries  in which  industry dummy variables  in the underlying  earnings 
functions  equations were significant.  The R2-statistic  is of the order of 
0.43-0.44  for the SIGFTYS sample, which  is quite high for cross-industry 
regressions  of this sort.  The fit is also better  for the weighted  than the 
unweighted  forms. However,  the coefficient  estimates  and significance  levels 
are remarkably  similar across  the four regression  forms. 
A. Affirmative  Action.  Our key variable, AA  (Affirmative Action),  is 
negative  in all four regressions,  indicating that industries  that have been  a 
more  frequent  target of affirmative  action have, on average,  a lower gender 
wage  gap in industry wage premia.  The variable  is statistically  significant  at 
the 5 percent  level in three of the four regression  forms and at the 10 
percent  level in the other.  The results  indicate rather strongly  that this 
program has been  effective  in narrowing  the female-male  gap in industry wage 
premia  and suggest  that, at least in part,  the gap in premia may have 
reflected  discrimination  against female workers within  industries. 
5 
It is important  to note that Leonard  (1996) finds no significant  impact 
during  the period  of the 1980s of his Affirmative  Action variable  on the 
gender  gap in earnings  -- rather than the gender gap in industry wage premia 
as we use here.  Leonard  (198413)  previously  found that the firms most  likely  to -12- 
be targets  for review were  those that already had high ratios of female  to 
male employment  and he concluded  that the main goal of the program was 
earnings  parity  rather  than more equitable  employment  distributions  of males 
and females.  Of course, cause and effect are difficult  to disentangle  here 
because  our data are for 1988, a time when a narrow  gap in gender  industry 
wage premia  may have reflected  earlier AA actions or at least the results  of 
defensive  actions  taken by firms to avert an investigation.  As Donohue  and 
Heckman  (1991) point out, the econometric  evidence  that government  Affirmative 
Action  efforts have had an impact are weak,  in large part because  available 
measures  of federal activity or pressure  are weak.  Beller  (1979) does report 
some evidence  that EEOC reduced  the gender wage gap, and Dolton,  O'Neill  and 
Sweetman  (1996) also find evidence  that anti-discrimination  laws reduced  the 
gender wage  gap in Great Britain.  However, none of these studies  looks 
specifically  at the effects of Affirmative  Action  on the gender gap in 
industry wage premia,  and the evidence here is that this program  did have  a 
significant  effect  on narrowing  this gap. 
B. EmDlovment  Growth.  Our second principal  finding is that EMPGRTH  is 
negative  in all four regressions,  indicating that industries  that have high 
rates of employment  growth have, on average,  low gender gaps in industry wage 
premia.  This variable  is statistically  significant  at the one percent  level in 
three out of the four regressions  and at the five percent  level in the fourth. 
This set of results clearly reinforces  the findings from our 1991 study 
and supports  our argument  that fast-growing  industries offer female workers 
opportunities  that are similar to those for males and thus tend to pay similar 
wage premia  to the two genders.  This may mean, as we mentioned  above,  that 
the occupational  distributions  of males and females are more  similar  in these -13- 
industries because  fast growth lowers barriers  to female workers  to enter 
those jobs where  either efficiency  or equity wage premia  are more  likely. 
This result  is somewhat  in line with Bell and Freeman's  (1991) finding  that 
the industries with  the greatest  increases in relative  female employment  were 
those with  the largest wage  increases. 
The results  on the effect of employment  growth on GGIWP are all the more 
impressive when  one remembers  that our model controls  for changes  in pay 
(PAYCHNG) and industry  sales growth  (SALESCHG) -- both of which widen  rather 
than narrow  the GGIWP.  Increases  in employment will narrow  the gap if they 
occur  in industries  in which male and female workers  are considered  close 
substitutes  (or where  there is less discrimination  against hiring  females). 
Such industries will be able to expand more rapidly because  they will be 
better  able to attract  females by paying  them more equitable wage premia. 
Leonard  (1986a) argues  that the efficacy of Affirmative  Action  depends 
critically  on growth.  Compliance  reviews are much more likely  to take place 
both  at large and at growing establishments  where detrimental  effects  on 
current male employees  are likely to be low. 
It is also possible  that slow or negative  growth may widen  the GGIWP  if, 
as Bound and Johnson  (1992) point out, the seniority  system  in shrinking 
industries  causes  them to fire the lowest level male workers  first while 
retaining  the senior male workers,  at the top of the wage distribution,  and to 
pay even lower wages  to new female hires because  female labor supply  is more 
elastic  than the male  labor supply.  This argument would explain why EMPGRTH 
has a negative  effect on GGIWP, and it would also be compatible with Bell and 
Freeman's  (1991) finding that the industries with the largest  increases  in the 
percentage  of female workers  also had the highest  growth rates and the highest 
average wage. -14- 
It may well be, given the negative  coefficient  of the PROFRATE variable, 
that the firms that expanded most had the highest profits  specifically  because 
they let in large numbers  of highly productive  females and paid they more 
equitably.  If females are more likely than males  to have difficulty  finding 
employment  at above average wage  levels, one might expect  them to work harder 
to hold  onto such jobs.  Sicherman  (1996) finds that women were more  likely 
than men  to quit jobs with one firm when they saw the possibility  of earning 
higher  wages  elsewhere.  Competitive market  theory holds  that the firms that 
will expand most will be those which do not discriminate  in a market  where 
others  do.  All these factors may help explain the strong, significant 
relation between  growth  in employment  and a narrowing  of the GGIWP. 
C. Profitabilitv.  Our third principal  finding is that PROFRATE  is 
negative  in all four regressions,  indicating  that industries  that have high 
profit  rates have,  on average,  low gender gaps in industry wage premia.  This 
variable  is statistically  significant  at the one percent  level in all four 
regressions. 
This result  could be attributed  to rent sharing.  Firms in protected 
markets  and with  greater ability to pay are more likely to share their bounty 
equitably  with both genders.  This finding is also compatible with  efficiency 
wage  theory, which predicts  that firms in competitive markets  become  large and 
profitable  specifically  because  they elicit greater productivity  and less 
turnover by paying  females,  like males,  above market wages  or by lowering 
barriers  to females entering  the occupations within  the industry where 
compensation  is greater  in order to reduce turnover and shirking.  Here,  too, 
if there  is greater discrimination  against females in the market  in general, 
female workers  will be all the more likely to work hard and hold  onto their -15- 
jobs at firms in such industries.  Sicherman  (1996) finds that women have 
higher  quit rates than men at early tenure on the job, but that as tenure 
increases, women's  quit rates decline  to levels similar to and eventually 
below  those of male workers.  Dolton, O'Neill and Sweetman  (1996) report  large 
increases  in unmeasured  labor quality of female workers  at high profit  firms 
in Great Britain.  Leonard  (1984a) finds that female employment  rose most  at 
federal contractor  firms with  the highest profits  and that there was no loss 
in productivity  at such firms and no evidence  that female productivity  was 
lower, on average,  at such firms. 
Pugel  (1980) finds that measures  of excess return or economic 
profitability  is superior  to measures  of market  concentration  in explaining 
inter-industry  variations  in wages and estimates  that labor receives  7 to 14 
percent  of the total excess return.  Pugel, however,  explains  this as 
efficiency  wages,  not rent sharing.  More productive  workers  end up in the 
high wage  industries.  It appears from our results that such industries  also 
pay females wage premia  closer  to those of males.  Moreover,  if female workers 
are more  likely than male workers  to be undercompensated  relative  to their 
"  true  " productivity  in general,  this would explain why female workers  would be 
even more  likely  than males  to raise the overall profit  level of firms that 
pay them more  equitably  through less shirking and lower turnover  rates. 
Krueger  and Summers  (1987), on the other hand, emphasize  the importance 
of rent sharing  as the explanation:  More profitable  industries,  those with 
monopoly  power, where  labor's share is smaller, pay higher wages  than less 
profitable  ones.  Managers  maximize  a utility  function which  includes both 
profits  and the well-being  of their workers.  With an inelastic product  demand 
curve,  the cost of raising wages would  thereby be reduced.  As a result, high -16- 
wage  industries  reward all types of workers  about equally,  despite wide 
differences  in their backgrounds  and job characteristics. 
A study by Luski and Weinblatt  (1994) for the Israeli economy  shows a 
clear-cut  positive  relationship  between  industry wage  levels and the degree  of 
monopolization  of an industry and concludes  that interindustry  wage 
differentials  are very  similar for workers  at both low and high  skill levels. 
It should also be noted  that Hodson  and England  (1986) find that although 
industry profits  are positively  correlated with both 
levels,  the positive  effect  is much  larger for males 
they find that industry concentration  has a negative 
both  genders  and this effect  is also much larger for 
study is based  on 1970 data, and they use aggregated 
wage  levels  in each industry and note that there may 
aggregation  problems  in their analysis. 
male and female wage 
(although,  interestingly, 
effect on earnings  for 
males).  However,  their 
data with average  gender 
have been  some serious 
Though we have no variable  for industry concentration  in our model,  we 
believe  our finding that high  industry profits  tend to narrow  the GGIWP  is 
essentially  compatible  with both rent sharing and efficiency  wage  theories, 
and the strong, highly  significant  results  in our study may most appropriately 
be explained  by the fact that high-profit  firms in both competitive  and 
concentrated  industries pay females wage premia  similar to those of male 
workers.  In the case of concentrated  industries,  it is likely  that causality 
runs from high profits  to a narrow  gender wage because  of equity 
considerations  and ability  to pay.  In the case of competitive  industries,  it 
is likely  that the causality  runs from a narrow  gender wage  gap to high 
profits,  because  if there is, in general, discrimination  against  females  in 
terms of pay,  it is likely that those firms who pay females efficiency  wages -17- 
comparable  to those of males will  increase their profits by eliciting  higher 
effort  and less turnover  from their female workers. 
6 
D. Plant Size.  The results  indicate that average plant  size  (PLANTSIZ) 
has a positive  coefficient  on GGIWP in all four regression,  indicating  that 
industries with  larger plant size tend to have larger gender  gaps in industry 
wage premia.  The coefficient  is significant  at the one percent  level in only 
one of the four regressions,  at the five percent  level in a second,  at the ten 
percent  level in a third, and is not significant  in the fourth.  Most  studies, 
such as Masters  (1969), show that larger plants pay higher  average wages. 
The usual  interpretation  is that large plant  industries  tend to have 
stronger unions  and lower ratios of female to male employment.  But, since 
union  strength has historically  meant higher wages or more generous  rent 
sharing  for more  senior workers  (usually male),  it might  explain  the wider  gap 
between  male and female wage premia  in such industries.  It may  too be 
associated  with  industries with strong preferences  for male workers, 
especially  in high  skill jobs, which might  imply payment  of larger wage premia 
to male workers  to attract  and retain male rather than female workers. 
Leonard  (1986b) argues  that corporate  size is probably  of greater consequence 
than establishment  size in affecting  gender wage differentials. 
E. Pav Changes and Sales Growth.  Both variables  have positive 
coefficients.  PAYCHNG  is significant  at the one percent  level in two of the 
four regressions,  at the five percent  level in a third, and at the ten percent 
level in the fourth.  SALESCHG  is significant  at the one percent  level  in one 
form, at the five percent  level in a second, and at the ten percent  level in a 
third and is not significant  in the fourth.  It should be noted  that the 
simple  correlation  between  SALESCHG and PAYCHNG is very  small, 0.06, 
suggesting  that the two effects are acting  independently  to widen  the GGIWP. -18- 
Our  interpretation  of these results hinges  on the fact that we have 
already  controlled  for employment  growth and profitability.  Increases  in 
industry  sales and pay tend to widen  the GGIWP because  shifts  in the demand 
for an industry's  output causes shifts  in the demand curve for both male  and 
female  labor.  These,  in turn, raise wages  that the firms will offer  to both 
genders.  Given  the fact that the male labor supply curve is generally  less 
elastic  than that for female workers,  this would mean that firms would be 
forced  to pay higher  wage premia  to male than female workers  and thus widen 
the gender  gap in the wage premia  in that industry.  Since the growth  in 
employment,  by  itself, narrows  the gender gap, so industries  that expand 
output  in response  to a rise in demand for their product by hiring  a smaller 
number  of  (mainly male) workers  do so by raising overall wage  levels, while 
industries  that expand by adding more female workers  show smaller rises  in 
overall wage  levels and larger increases  in employment.  Both effects  are 
compatible  with  the differing  elasticities  of male and female  labor supply. 
Some support  is provided  by Bell and Freeman  (1991), who find that firms with 
the largest  increases  in sales had the highest wage  increases but  the lowest 
employment  growth.  These firms may have hired  females by using  them to 
replace  low skill males or those with  the least seniority  (cf. Bound and 
Johnson,  1992). 
The evidence  in our study here suggests that the industries with  the 
biggest  increases  in demand  for their products have been  those with  a 
preference  for male workers  or those with the least incentives  to pay similar, 
rent-sharing,  equity  or efficiency wages  to workers  of both genders.  It may be 
that they attract new male workers by paying  large wage premia while 
attracting  female workers by lowering the credentials  required  for hiring.  It -19- 
is also clear  that import-competing  industries,  for which  output prices  and 
sales declined  during  this period,  showed smaller wage  increases  for all 
workers  during  the 1980s. This would narrow  the gender gap in wage premia,  if 
males had been more  likely than females to benefit  from rent sharing before 
the decline  in demand  for the industry's output, or if males  at the top of the 
wage  ladder were more  likely than others, of both genders,  to have  left these 
industries when  demand and pay declined.  Sachs and Shatz  (1996) support  this 
argument with  the observation  that the overall gender gap in wages  tended  to 
narrow  in these industries. 
F. Education.  The average level of education of workers  within  an 
industry  (MEANEDUC)  is generally negatively  related to GGIWP, but  the 
coefficient  is significant  in only one of the four regressions  (and then at 
only the ten percent  level).  As such, we must conclude  that average  education 
does not have much  impact on the GGIWP.  We include this variable  because 
Dickens  and Katz  (1987) find education  to be the most  important variable  in 
explaining  inter-industry  variations  in average wages  (including both 
genders).  Bound and Johnson  (1992), too, cite a substantial  increase  in the 
relative wages  of highly  educated workers  during the 198Os, presumed  to be 
brought  about by a shift in the skill structure of labor demand during  this 
period. 
The standard  deviation  of education  (STDEDUC) is not significant  in any 
of the four regressions.  We  include this variable  as a proxy  for the range  in 
the occupational  distribution  of workers within  an industry.  As noted  above, 
one of the reasons why males and females in the same industry might  receive 
different  wage premia  is that the occupational  distributions  of male and 
female workers  within  that industry might differ.  Further,  this might  reflect -2o- 
geographic  variations  in the disparities  of educational  credentials  required 
of female relative  to male workers within  the same industry when  local labor 
market  conditions  differ.  We thought that such gender disparities  might be 
correlated  with  the overall variation  of educational  levels within  an industry 
but  this result  is not borne  out by the regression  analysis. 
G.  Caoital  Intensity.  The capital-labor  ratio has a negative 
coefficient  in all four regressions but is not significant  in any.  We  include 
capital  intensity  since as, Masters  (1969) and others have argued, more 
capital  intensive  industries might require more highly  skilled workers  and 
production  might  entail greater coordination  and therefore  such industries 
might  generally have higher  interindustry wage differentials.  The results 
here  indicate  that the gender wage gap is not related to this variable. 
5.  Sumvrrp  and Policv  liplications 
Our principal  finding is that Affirmative  Action,  employment  growth,  and 
profitability  each leads to a narrowing  of the gender gap in industry wage 
premia.  These effects act independently  of each other.  With regard  to the 
Affirmative  Action  variable,  our results contrast  sharply with  those of 
Leonard  (1996), who concludes  that Affirmative  Action had  lost its 
effectiveness  as a measure  to reduce the gender wage gap in the 1980s.  The 
difference  in results  is likely attributable  to the fact that the dependent 
variable  in his regression  analysis  is the gender gap in earnings, whereas 
ours is the gender gap in industry wage premia. 
In terms of policy  implications,  our results provide  new support  to the 
recent  effectiveness  of the Affirmative  Action program, which  is currently 
under  fire from so many  sources and has been greatly diminished  in size and -21- 
budget  since the late 1970s.  Our results are particularly  important because 
they refer  to industry wage premia  and thus control for differences  in male 
and female productivity  and more accurately  reflect discrimination  effects 
than the female-male  wage gap.  Indeed, in our 1995 study, we estimated  that 
gender  differences  in industry wage premia might have explained  as much  as 22 
percent  of the overall male-female  wage gap. 
The very  strong evidence we have produced  on the subject of industry 
employment  growth  is indirectly related to the Affirmative  Action  program.  As 
Leonard  (1986b) observes,  it is more  fruitful to target such programs, 
particularly  compliance  reviews, at fast-growing  industries,  since these are 
the ones  in which  increasing both female wages and female employment 
opportunities  will have  the least adverse effect on the earnings  and 
opportunities  of existing male employees.  In stagnant  industries,  in 
contrast,  such programs will  take the form of a zero-sum game in which  raising 
female wages  and employment  opportunities  will occur at the expense  of males. 
so, too, are the implications  of industry profitability.  Though we 
cannot  conclude  from our study here which way the direction  of causality  runs 
__ firms either  increase their profits by paying  females more equitably  (if 
the premia  represent  efficiency wages)  or spread their excess profits more 
equitably  with  female workers  (to the extent the premia  represent  rents).  In 
either case, government  policy  should be aimed at educating  firms as to the 
profit-enhancing  benefits  from paying  females equitably  or admitting  females 
into jobs where  efficiency wages are relevant.  Moreover,  equal opportunity 
programs  should be strongly  targeted on firms in high profit  industries. -22- 
Footnotes 
*  Department  of Economics,  Lehman College, City University  of New York 
** Department  of Economics,  New York University 
We would  like to thank the Jerome Levy Economics  Institute  of Bard College  for 
their financial  support for this project. 
'  See Fields  and Wolff  (1995) for a full list of wage premia by gender  at the 
3-digit  industry  level. 
2  See Fields  and Wolff  (1995) for more details on the estimation  techniques. 
3  Appendix  3 shows a comparison  of our male and female  industry wage premia 
for full year workers  in one digit industries with  theirs for the 9 industries 
they looked  at in the U.S.  Considering  that Blau and Kahn's  specification  for 
their earnings  equation was different  from ours and that they used smaller 
samples,  there is a surprising  degree of similarity between  their results  and 
ours.  The rank correlation  between  the two sets of coefficients  is quite high 
(0.82 for females and  0.73 for males).  Shown also is a comparison  of results 
for GGIWP  (see below  for the definition).  There is again a high  degree  of 
correspondence,  with  a rank correlation  of 0.73. 
4  Two of the original  158 industries were not included in the EVERYIND 
regressions  because  at least one of the independent variables  for this 
industry has an extreme  outlier value. 
5  We also used an alternative  version  of this index, the dollar value  of 
federal  government  purchases  from industry i divided by the number  of 
establishments  in industry  i.  However,  this variable was not statistically 
significant  in any of the regressions. 
'  In an alternative  regression  specification,  we substituted  the growth  in 
labor productivity  (defined as sales divided by employment)  over the 1986-88 
period  for sales growth.  The coefficient  of labor productivity  growth was -23- 
negative  in every case but was statistically  not as significant  as that for 
sales growth. -24- 
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Table 1 
Descriptive  Statistics  on the Gender Gap in Industry Wage Premia  (GGIWP) 
For Alternative  Samples of Workers 
Sample 
Standard  Minimum  Maximum 
Mean  Deviation  Value  Value 
158 Three-digit  Industries  -0.09  0.12  -0.47  0.40 
with no missing  data 
86 Three-digit  Industries  -0.09  0.11  -0.46  0.24 
with no missing  data and 
male  and female  industry 
dummy variables  are both 
statistically  significant 
at 10 percent  level 
81 Three-digit  Industries  -0.08  0.11  -0.53 
with no missing  data and 
male  and female  industry 
dummy variables  for FTFY 
workers  only are both 
statistically  significant 
at 10 percent  level 
0.20 
a.  Computations  from the 1988 Current Population  Survey.  See Appendix  2 for 
a full listing of values  of GGIWP at the 3-digit industry. -28- 
Table 2 
Regression  Results  of Gender Gap in Industry Wage Premia  (GGIWP) on Industry 
Characteristics 
Mean Values  of 
Independent  Variables 
EVERYIND'  SIGFTYSC 
Regression  Coefficientsa 
EVERYIND'  SIGFTYSC 
unweighted  weighted  unweighted  weighted 
Constant  0.133 
AA  (Affirmative  Action)  -0.020" 
1.30  1.10  (0.011) 
EMPGRTH  (Employment Growth)  -0.309*** 
0.03  0.04 
PROFRATE  (Profit Rate) 
0.65  0.67 
PLANTSIZ  (Plant Size) 
51.5  60.1 
PAYCHNG  (Pay Change) 
0.12  0.12 
SALESCHG  (Sales Growth) 
0.24  0.26 
MEANEDUC  (Education) 
12.7  12.6 
STDEDUC  (Std Dev of Educ) 
2.46  2.47 
KLRATIO  (Capital/Labor) 
4.04  3.85 
R2-Statistic 
(F-Statistic) 
Standard  Error 






0.262"""  0.242""" 









0.190  0.313 
(3.8)  (7.4) 
0.1073  1.524 





































0.427  0.444 
(5.9)  (6.3) 
0.0895  1.369 




















a.  Standard  errors are shown below regression  coefficient. 
b.  Includes  all industries with no missing  data. 
C.  Includes  only industries with no missing  data and for which male  and 
female  industry dummy variables  for FTFY workers  are both  statistically 
significant  at the 10 percent  level. -29- 
*** significant  at the one percent  level  (2-tailed test) 
i*  significant  at the five percent  level  (2-tailed test) 
significant  at the ten percent  level  (2-tailed test) -3o- 
Appendix  1 
Data Sources and Methods 
AA, = the relative  incidence of federal contractor  firms in industry  i. 
Though we tried several  indices to represent  this variable,  the most 
successful  was based  on Leonard  (1984b)'s data.  The variable  is defined  as 
the percentage  of Leonard's  sample of 69,000 federal contractor  firms that are 
in industry  i divided by the percent  of his sample with non-federal  contractor 
firms in industry  i. 
EMPGRTHi = the percentage  growth  in employment  in industry  i over the 
1986-88 period.  This was computed  from data in the 1986 and 1988 Current 
Population  Surveys. 
PROFRATEi = average profit  rate for firms in industry  i over the 3 year 
period,  1986-88,  defined as total business  receipts minus  cost of sales and 
operations  per dollar of assets.  The source is: Internal Revenue  Service, 
Statistics  of Income, Corooration  Income Tax Returns,  Publication  16 (Rev. ll- 
91), 1986, 1987 and 1988. 
PLANTSIZ,  = average number  of workers per establishment  in industry  i 
over the 3 year period,  1986-88.  The source is:  U.S. Bureau  of the Census, 
Countv  Business  Patterns  1986-88 United  States, CBP 88-01, December  1990. 
PAYCHNGi = percent  change  in the annual payroll  of industry  i over the 3 
year period,  1986-88.  The source is: U.S. Bureau of the Census,  OD.  cit. 
SALESCHGi  = percent  change  in the total business  receipts  of industry  i 
over the 3 year period,  1986-88.  The source is: Internal Revenue  Service, m 
cit. 
MEANEDUCi = average years of schooling  for workers  in industry  i in 1988. 
This was computed  from data in the 1988 Current Population  Survey. -31- 
STDEDUC, = the standard deviation  in years of schooling  among workers  in 
industry  i in 1988.  This was computed  from data in the 1988 Current 
Population  Survey. 
KLRATIO, = average value of assets per employee  for firms in industry  i 
in 1988.  The source  is:  Internal Revenue  Service,  OD.  cit., 1988. -32- 
Appendix 2 
Values of GGIWP, Gender Gap in Industry  Wage Premia, for 3-Digit Industriesa 
Rank  Industry  GGIWP  Significant?b 
1  LEATHER PRODUCTS  EX FOOTWEARC 
2  OFFICES OF PHYSICIANS 
3  DAIRY PRODUCTS STORES 
4  LIBRARIES 
5  BUSINESS  MANAG SERVICES 
6  HARDWARE+HEAT  WHSL TR 
7  OFFICES OF DENTISTS 
8  OTHER PRIMARY  METAL 
9  RETL NURSERIES 
10  MISC PERSONAL SERVICES 
11  HORTICULTURAL  SERVICES 
12  ELEC+GAS  UTIL 
13  DRUG STORES 
14  FORESTRY 
15  SHIP+BOAT  BLDG+REPAIR 
16  JEWELRY STORES 
17  FOOD STORES  NEC 
18  COMPUTER+DATA  PROC SERVICES 
19  LEGAL SERVICES 
20  PAPER PROD WHSL TR 
21  SECURITY  BROKERS+INVST 
22  BUSINESS SERVICES,  n.e.c. 
23  OFFICES OF HEALTH PRAC NEC 
24  SPORTING  GODS STORES 
25  LUMBER WHSL TR 
26  BUS+TRADE SCHOOLS 
27  PRINTING PUBLISH EX NEWSPAPERSSS 
28  PAPERBOARD  CONTAINERS+BOXES 
29  PHOTO EQUIP MFG 
30  CEMENT+PLASTER  PROD MFG 
31  NONCOMMERCL SCIENTIFIC  RESCH 
32  MEMBERSHIP ORGAN' 
33  PRIM ALUMINUM US 
34  FUNERAL PARLORS 
35  BLAST FURNACES STEELWRKS 
36  GAS+STEAM  UTIL 
37  SHOE STORES 
38  DRUGS MFG 
39  ELEC LIGHT+POWER  UTIL 
40  MISC VEHICLE DEALERS 
41  FISHING  HUNTING+TRAPPING 
42  ELEC MACH NEC 
43  GROCERY STORES 
44  PLASTICS SYNTHETICS+RESINS 
45  LIQUOR STORES 
-0.474  No 
-0.461  Yes 
-0.397  No 
-0.377  No 
-0.357  No 
-0.324  No 
-0.323  Yes 
-0.296  No 
-0.280  No 
-0.277  No 
-0.274  No 
-0.269  Yes 
-0.254  Yes 
-0.236  Yes 
-0.223  Yes 
-0.223  Yes 
-0.220  No 
-0.211  No 
-0.208  No 
-0,204  No 
-0.203  Yes 
-0.199  No 
-0.199  No 
-0.198  Yes 
-0.197  No 
-0.192  Yes 
-0.189  Yes 
-0.188  No 
-0.186  No 
-0.184  No 
-0.177  No 
-0.173  Yes 
-0.173  No 
-0.169  Yes 
-0.163  No 
-0.158  No 
-0.157  Yes 
-0.156  No 
-0.152  Yes 
-0.149  No 
-0.149  No 
-0.148  Yes 
-0.147  Yes 
-0.147  No 
-0.144  No -33- 
46  BUS SERVICE+URBAN  TRNSPT 
47  LUMBER RETL TR 
48  CREDIT AGENCIES 
49  MISC PLASTIC PRODUCTS  MFG 
50  ENGINEER+ARCHITECT  SERVICES 
51  DEPARTMENT STORES 
52  BANKING 
53  THEATERS+MOVIES 
54  MISC STONE PROD MFG 
55  TRUCKING 
56  ALCOHOLIC BEV WHSL TR 
57  MISC FAB TEXTILE PRODCTS 
58  FAB STRUCTURL  METAL MFG 
59  INSURANCE 
60  TELEGRAPH  UTIL 
61  MISC WHSL NONDUR GDS 
62  GLASS MFG 
63  BEAUTY SHOPS 
64  SOAPS+COSMETICS  MFG 
65  MISC ENTERTAIN SERVICES 
66  LAUNDRY+CLEANING  SERVICES 
67  LODGING EX HOTELS 
68  MOTOR VEH+EQUIP  MFG 
69  METALWRKING  MACHINERY 
70  CONSTRUCTION 
71  INDUS CHEMICALS  MFG 
72  YARN TEAD+FABRIC  MILLS 
73  SAVINGS+LOANS 
74  INC TRANSPORT SERVICES 
75  RADIO+TV  MFG 
76  HEALTH SERVICES  NEC 
77  PETROLEUM  REFINING 
78  SC1 INSTRUMENTS  MFG 
79  APPAREL+ACCESSORIES  MFG 
80  OFFICE+ACCTNG  MACHINES 
81  GROCERIES  WHSL TR 
82  MISC GEN STORES 
83  MISC MFG US 
84  RAILROADS 
85  MISC WOOD PROD MFG 
86  AUTO+HOME SUPPLY STORES 
87  BOWLING ALLEYS 
88  APPAREL STORES 
89  MOTOR VEH DEALERS 
90  MISC RETAIL STORES 
91  NEWSPAPER PUB+PRINTING 
92  ELFMEN+SECONDARY  SCHOOLS 
93  WATER TRANSPORT 
94  MACH EX ELECTRICAL  MFG 
95  ACCTNG+AUDIT SERVICES 
96  MISC TEXTILE PROD MFG 
97  MACHINERY+EQUIP  WHSL TR 
-0.143  Yes 
-0.141  Yes 
-0.140  Yes 
-0.140  No 
-0.139  No 
-0.139  Yes 
-0.138  No 
-0.137  Yes 
-0.137  No 
-0.132  No 
-0.130  No 
-0.129  Yes 
-0.127  No 
-0.126  No 
-0.124  No 
-0.120  Yes 
-0.116  No 
-0.106  No 
-0.106  No 
-0.106  Yes 
-0.105  Yes 
-0.105  Yes 
-0.103  Yes 
-0.103  No 
-0.102  No 
-0.100  Yes 
-0.100  No 
-0.099  Yes 
-0.098  Yes 
-0.096  No 
-0.095  Yes 
-0.095  Yes 
-0.093  No 
-0.092  Yes 
-0.092  No 
-0.092  No 
-0.091  Yes 
-0.090  Yes 
-0.089  Yes 
-0.088  Yes 
-0.087  Yes 
-0.085  No 
-0.082  Yes 
-0.080  Yes 
-0.080  Yes 
-0.079  Yes 
-0.078  Yes 
-0.078  No 
-0.077  No 
-0.077  No 
-0.075  No 
-0.075  No -34- 
98  METAL FORGINGS+STAMP 
99  EATING+DRINKING  PLACES 
100  CONSTR+HANDLING  MACHINES 
101  PULP PAPER+PAPERBRD  MILLS 
102  COMMERCIAL  R+D+TEST LABS 
103  HARDWARE STORES 
104  FURNITURE  MFG 
105  RETAIL BAKERIES 
106  GAS SERVICE STATIONS 
107  HOTELS+MOTELS 
108  FURNITURE STORES 
109  APPAREL+FABRIC  WHSL TR 
110  MEAT PROD MFG 
111  JOB TRNG+VOC SERVICES 
112  ELECTRON COMPUTING  MFG 
113  COLLEGES+UNIVERSITIES 
114  SERVICES  TO DWELLINGS 
115  OPTICAL+HEALTH  SUPPLIES  MFG 
116  KNIT MILLS 
117  HH APP RADIO+TV STORES 
118  AIR TRANSPORT 
119  METALS+MIN  WHSL TR 
120  TELEPHONE  UTIL 
121  CRUDE PETROL+NAT  GAS EKTRCTN 
122  DRUGS+CHEM  WHSL TR 
123  NURSING CARE FACILITIES 
124  GUIDED MISSILES MFGC 
125  VARIETY STORES 
126  ELEC GDS WHSL TR 
127  OTHER RUBBER PRODUCTS  MFG 
128  CUTLERY+HARDWARE  MFG 
129  HH APPLIANCES  MFG 
130  MISC FAB METAL PROD MFG 
131  MISC PAPER+PULP  PROD 
132  SANITARY SERV 
133  HOSPITALS 
134  REAL ESTATE 
135  MOTOR VEH WHSL TR 
136  EDUC SERVICES  NEC 
137  FARM PRODCTS  WHSL TR 
138  WATER SUPPLY  UTIL 
139  TOYS+SPORTING  MFG 
140  FARM SUPP  WHSL TR 
141  AIRCRAFT+PRTS  MFG 
142  WAREHOUSING+STORAGE 
143  RESIDET CARE FACILITIES 
144  ADERTISING 
145  PETROLEUM  WHSL TR 
146  BOOK+STATIONERY  STORES 
147  MISC PROF+RELATED  SERVICES 
148  PERSONNEL SUPPLY SERVICES 
149  MISC REPAIR SERVICES 
-0.070  No 
-0.069  Yes 
-0.067  No 
-0.065  Yes 
-0.064  No 
-0.062  Yes 
-0.057  Yes 
-0.055  Yes 
-0.052  Yes 
-0.051  Yes 
-0.048  Yes 
-0.046  No 
-0.042  Yes 
-0.041  Yes 
-0.038  Yes 
-0.036  Yes 
-0.032  Yes 
-0.025  No 
-0.025  Yes 
-0.024  Yes 
-0.023  Yes 
-0.021  No 
-0.018  Yes 
-0.017  Yes 
-0.017  No 
-0.011  Yes 
-0.010  Yes 
-0.009  No 
-0.003  No 
-0.003  No 
-0.001  No 
0.001  Yes 
0.006  No 
0.011  No 
0.012  No 
0.015  Yes 
0.018  Yes 
0.022  Yes 
0.022  Yes 
0.025  Yes 
0.026  No 
0.029  No 
0.031  Yes 
0.032  Yes 
0.036  No  . 
0.038  Yes 
0.038  No 
0.040  No 
0.043  Yes 
0.050  No 
0.059  Yes 
0.061  Yes -35- 
150  AGRI  SERV EX HORTICUL 
151  FOOTWEAR  EX RUBBER MFG 
152  ORDNANCE 
153  DETECTIVE+PROTECT  SERVICES 
154  TIRES+INNER  TUBES MFG 
155  RADIO+TV  BROADCAST 
156  SAWMILLS 
157  AGRI  PDC LIVESTCK 
158  MOBILE  HOME DEALERS 
0.068  Yes 
0.090  Yes 
0.100  No 
0.110  Yes 
0.113  Yes 
0.146  Yes 
0.159  No 
0.242  Yes 
0.400  No 
a.  Industries  are ranked  in terms of the value  of GGIWP. 
b.  "Yes" indicates  that male and female industry dummy variables  are both 
statistically  significant  at the 10 percent  level in the earnings  function 
regressions. 
c. This  industry  is not included in the EVERYIND regressions  because  at least 
one of the independent variables  for this industry has an extreme  outlier 
value. -36- 
Appendix  3 
Comparison  of Our Results with Blau and Kahn  (1992) 
A.  Coefficient  Estimates  of Industry Dummy Variablesa 
Industry 
Category 
Male Workers  Female Workers 
Blau & Kahn  Our Study  Blau & Kahn  Our Study 
Coeff(rank)  Coeff(rank)  Coeff(rank)  Coeff(rank) 
Agriculture,  Forestry,  -0.527" (9)  -0.333" 
and Fisheries 
Mining  and Construction  -0.303  (7)  0.005" 
Manufacturing,  Durables  0.066  (2)  0.536" 
Manufacturing,  Non-Durables  -0.245" (4)  -0.063" 
Transportation,  Communica-  0.134  (1)  0.120" 
tion and Utilities 
Wholesale  Trade  -0.299  (6)  -0.073* 
Retail  Trade  -0.380" (8)  -0.307" 
Finance,  Insurance,  and  -0.038  (3)  -0.016 
Real Estate 
Services  -0.249" (5)  -0.164" 
(9)  0.110  (1)  -0.319*  (9) 
(3)  -0.184"  (6)  -0.001"  (5) 
(2)  0.018  (4)  0.054*  (2) 
(5)  -0.055  (5)  0.026"  (3) 
(1)  0.040  (2)  0.072*  (1) 
(6)  0.294"  (8)  -0.078*  (6) 
(8)  -0.303"  (9)  -0.224"  (8) 
(4)  0.040  (3)  0.001  (4) 
(7)  -0.280*  (7)  -0.150"  (7) 
Intercept  8.149  0.938  8.238  1.020 
Sample  Size  1,194  24,460  1,406  33,519 
Rank Correlation  0.73  0.82 
B. Estimates  of GGIWP 
Industry  Blau & Kahn  Our Study 
Category  Coeff.  (rank)  Coeff(rank) 
Agriculture,  Forestry,  -0.726 (9)  -0.100 (6) 
and Fisheries 
Mining  and Construction  -0.207 (7)  0.075  (4) 
Manufacturing,  Durables  0.500  (1)  0.400  (1) 
Manufacturing,  Non-Durables  -0.279 (8)  -0.170 (9) 
Transportation,  Communica-  0.005  (2)  -0.036 (3) 
tion and Utilities 
Wholesale  Trade  -0.093 (4)  -0.077  (5) 
Retail  Trade  -0.165 (5)  -0.164 (8) 
Finance,  Insurance,  and  -0.166 (6)  -0.099 (7) 
Real Estate 
Services  -0.057 (3)  0.095  (2) 
Rank Correlation  0.73 
a. Both sets of regression  coefficients  are based on full-time workers  only. 
Public  administration  is the omitted category  in both studies.  Blau and Kahn -37- 
combined mining  and construction  into one category whereas we estimated 
separate  coefficients  for each industry, which are combined  into a weighted 
average  in the table above. Blau and Kahn also estimated  a single coefficient 
for services, whereas  we estimated  separate coefficients  for four service 
industries,  which  are combined  into a weighted  average  in the table above. 
*  The regression  coefficient  for the corresponding  industry dummy variable  is 
significant  at the 10 percent  level. Working  Paper  Series 
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